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Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets

arXiv cs.AI · 15 Oct 2026, 03:57 AEST

The paper discusses the dynamics of first-price auctions in decentralized agentic markets where AI agents bid for user prompts. It highlights how certain market features can reduce welfare loss, quantified by the price-of-anarchy.

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The paper discusses the dynamics of first-price auctions in decentralized agentic markets where A I agents bid for user prompts. It highlights how certain market features can reduce welfare loss, quantified by the price-of-anarchy. An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where A I agents bid to claim each user prompt. First-price auctions FPAs, in which the highest bidder pays its bid and receives the prompt, are a natural way to allocate prompts in such a market. This welfare loss is quantified by the price-of-anarchy PoA. We show that competition among them then limits the welfare loss, which can be driven to zero as the floor rises. We validate these results empirically using auctions with strategic bidders simulated on the EmbedLLM prompt routing dataset.

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